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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
VAL DEAN GIBSON 
Defendant/Appellant 
Third District Court Case No. 021912551 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20050627 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ISSUES 
I. Whether the plea agreement in the case was a waiver of res judicata defenses. 
II. Whether the trial court erred in ordering a restitution amount nearly two and one half 
times greater than the amount of judgment obtained by the victim in a civil case involving the same 
facts and circumstances. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-101 etseq. The Utah Crime Victims Restitution Act. The 
full text of the pertinent sections is attached in the addendum. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The plea agreement in this case does not waive res judicata as a defense. Admitting the 
elements of a crime by pleading guilty does not amount to waiving the defense of res judicata. The 
State cites no authorities to support the contention that a defendant waives res judicata principles by 
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entering into a plea agreement. Moreover, there was no mutual agreement concerning the State's 
request for restitution and its amount, only acknowledgment that the State would be seeking such. 
Acknowledging that the State will pursue a certain course does not mean the defendant agrees with 
that course. 
The plain language of the Crime Victims Restitution Act (the Act) limits the criminal 
restitution amount to that which can be recovered in a civil action. U.C.A. § 77-38a-102(6). If the 
civil action has occurred, res judicata applies. For purposes of determining the amount of 
restitution, the State and the victim are in privity because the court must look at the rights of the 
victim in a civil action. Id. The State has the right to seek restitution independently of the victim, 
but the amount of restitution is not independent of the victim's right - it is limited to what the 
victim could recover in a civil action. Id. While the victim may not be limited by the criminal 
proceedings, the State is limited by the civil proceedings because of the plain language of the 
statute. 
ARGUMENT 
L DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RES JUDICATA DEFENSE IN THE 
PLEA AGREEMENT. 
The plea agreement does not show any agreement on the amount of restitution. It shows 
only the State's intentions to seek restitution. Pleading guilty to the elements of a crime does not 
mean that a defendant waives all rights. The wording of the agreement shows that the defendant 
understood that the State would seek restitution, but shows no consent to pay it absent a court order, 
and no agreement to any amount. 
The wording of the plea agreement is that the State "may seek" criminal restitution and that 
"criminal restitution ... will be requested by the State." R. 165; Aple. Br. at 4. These are simply 
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statements of the State's intent. It is not assent by the defendant to the State's request. The 
agreement states that "the State firmly believes ... that restitution ... will be at or above $148,955." 
Id. Just because the agreement states that the State believes something does not mean the 
defendant agrees with such belief or agrees to pay any particular amount. Acknowledging that the 
prosecution intends to do something does not amount to acquiescing to the intent. The defendant is 
free to argue against the State once the State begins its pursuit of restitution. The plea agreement in 
this case does not waive any res judicata defenses. 
H. RES JUDICATA APPLIES BETWEEN THE CIVIL JUDGMENT AND THE 
CRIMINAL RESTITUTION AMOUNT BECAUSE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE 
OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES IT. 
The critical issue is whether the State is a privy of the victim when determining the amount 
of restitution a court may order. The narrow issue in question in which privity applies is the issue 
of the amount of criminal restitution a court can order. In detemiining the amount of restitution, the 
State is a privy of the victim because the plain language of the statute requires the court to 
determine the State's ability to recover restitution on behalf of the victim by looking at what the 
victim could recover in a civil action. U.C.A. § 77-38a-102(6). The State and the victim are "so 
identified in interest with" each other that they have the same legal rights because the State's ability 
to recover any certain amount of restitution is limited by the victim's ability to recover in a civil 
action. SearleBros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978) 
A. The rights of the State and the victim are essentially the same when 
determining the amount of restitution. 
The State argues that its interest in remediation and rehabilitation differentiate its interest 
from that of the victims to the extent that there is no privity. Aple. Br at 17. However, the 
rehabilitative and remedial effects are not achieved by requiring the defendant to pay money, but by 
3 
requiring the defendant to pay the money owed to the victim. To seek for any other remedy is to 
seek for punitive damages, which is outside the purposes of the statute. U.C.A. § 77-3 8a-
302(5)(c)(iii), see Addendum. See also Aplt. Br. at 10, 11. The State's interest then is to determine 
the amount of money owed to the victim. In a civil suit, the victim's interest is also to determine 
the amount of money owed to him. These are identical interests, and therefore establish privity 
according to Searle. 
The State's independent right based upon remedial and rehabilitative goals does not affect 
the fact that the amount of criminal restitution can only be determined by looking at the civil rights 
of the victim. U.C.A § 77-38a-102(6). 
B. Section 403(1) of the Crime Victims Restitution Act does not prelude the 
existence of privity because independent rights to sue do not alter the 
identical interests of the State and the victim in determining the amount 
owed to the victim. 
The State argues that U.C.A. § 77-38a-403(l) in the Crime Victims Restitution Act 
precludes the possibility of privity between the State and the victim because the victim has an 
independent civil right to litigate. However, this civil right does not affect the fact that the State's 
right to recover restitution on behalf of the victim is limited by the victim's ability to recover in 
civil court. The narrow issue at question is the amount of restitution, not the ability to bring a civil 
or criminal suit. 
The victim may be able to litigate his damages separately from the State, but the State does 
not have the ability to litigate separately from the possible civil suit. Whereas § 403(1) precludes 
the victim from bringing criminal evidence into the civil trial, § 102(6) of the Act requires that civil 
evidence be used in the criminal trial because the court must determine what the victim "could 
recover in a civil action." U.C.A § 77-38a-102(6). 
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The State argues that res judicata should not apply because the victim's independent right to 
pursue a remedy can not be limited by the Act. Aple. Br. at 16. However, the issue is not the limits 
of the victim's right to recover. The issue is the limits of the State's ability to recover on behalf of 
the victim. Applying res judicata when the civil action has already occurred does not hamper the 
victim's ability to litigate. The victim has already exercised that right. 
C Res judicata applies because any issues not decided in the civil trial could 
and should have been decided at that time. 
The activities in 2000 and 2001 which the State claimed were not litigated could and should 
have been litigated. Mr. Gomez could and should have determined the extent of his damages 
because he knew of the embezzlement and knew the length of his relationship with Mr. Gibson. 
The facts are inconsistent with the assertion that Mr. Gomez could only have brought a claim based 
upon the later and not the earlier infractions. There is nothing in the record to support the claim that 
Mr. Gomez could not have brought his entire claim. Once the civil suit was completed, Mr. Gomez 
could no longer bring an action based upon the conduct he failed to litigate earlier. Clock v. Green, 
1999 UT App 291 (Utah Ct App. 1999) citing Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 
1985) ("Failure to raise all relevant issues when the party is afforded a fair opportunity to do so is a 
waiver of those issues not raised.") Because res judicata bars Mr. Gomez from re-litigating in civil 
court, it also bars him from re-litigating in criminal court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, the appellant respectfully requests the court to limit the May 16, 
2005 restitution order to that amount determined in a preceding civil trial involving the same 
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underlying facts, issues and parties, namely to the amount of Fifty-nine Thousand eight hundred 
eighty dollars and twenty nine cents ($59,880.29). 
BrooKe Wilkins 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE 
CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION *** 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 38a. 
CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT (2005) 
§ 77-38a-101. Title 
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act." 
§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
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(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition 
that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the victim, or 
fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting 
the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes 
punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant 
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant will 
enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he 
comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following acceptance 
of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement by 
which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed 
without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, 
reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for 
extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12) (a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an offender; 
and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that the 
person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative 
action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or cause 
a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14) (a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
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AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, inserted "reimbursement 
for payment of a reward" in Subsection (11); added Subsection (12); and made changes in 
subsection designations. 
The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, in Subsection (6), substituted "demonstrable 
economic injury, whether or not yet incurred" for "special damages, but not general damages" and 
"fair market value" for "money equivalent," deleted "against the defendant" after "recover," and 
added "but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering." 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has 
the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through 
(5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction 
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one 
year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the 
court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees 
to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to 
physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
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(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily 
injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of 
or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential 
to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the 
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of 
sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year after 
sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an order of 
judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
§ 77-38a-403. Civil action by victim for damages 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the right of a person injured 
by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. 
Evidence that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part may not be 
introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the 
restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against 
any judgment in favor of the victim in the civil action. 
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defendant's liability for 
pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is 
involved in a subsequent civil action. 
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